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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2014. Pp. 223.
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Anna Su 2
INTRODUCTION
Does the history of the Religion Clauses still matter? The
answer appears to be increasingly irrelevant in the modern
constitutional world. After all, questions such as “what if religion
is not special?” and “why tolerate religion?” have recently gained
remarkable traction in mainstream legal and philosophical
3
scholarship. These questions and the attitudes underlying them
suggest a contemporary openness towards discarding a special
solicitude for religion that was largely borne out of history. In
many debates today, both inside and outside the courts, religious
4
liberty claims are now seen as pretexts for discrimination, not as
1. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of San Diego and CoExecutive Director of the USD Institute for Law and Religion.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. S.J.D.,
Harvard Law School. Thanks to Adam Shinar, Chris Szabla and Mark Tushnet for their
helpful comments.
3. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What
If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). See also CHRISTOPHER L.
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
(2007); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility
of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Why
Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (holding
that refusal to photograph a same-sex couple is in violation of state antidiscrimination
laws); N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (medical facility’s refusal to provide fertility treatment to a lesbian
couple on religious grounds is a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act). For academic
treatment, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE LAW
(2005); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007).
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the hard-won product of a long struggle for liberation from the
5
temporal reach of divine revelation. How did we get here?
One reason for the unmooring of contemporary questions
and answers involving the Religion Clauses from its historical
roots is the seeming inability of its own history to supply any
coherent or meaningful answer to currently vexing questions
surrounding religious freedom. Indeed, even the history itself is
contested. The Supreme Court did not help in clarifying matters
6
either when it issued contradictory rulings one after another.
While many scholars have been content to live with this
arrangement, with one scholar calling the Establishment Clause
7
largely irrelevant, others continued the Herculean task of making
8
sense of the doctrinal quagmire. Whereas twelve years ago, two
prominent legal scholars could describe the question of whether
publicly funded vouchers may be used at private, religious schools
without violating the Establishment Clause as the most important
9
church-state issue at the time, today, religious questions are at
the heart of an even more divisive, if not explosive, question in
American society: the fight over gay rights and marriage equality.
In this context, the history of the Clauses does not appear to offer
any surefire ammunition for either side.
The present analysis takes at its point of departure the claims
advanced by Professor Steven D. Smith, a law professor at the
University of San Diego, and a prominent scholar of the Religion
Clauses, in his new book The Rise and Decline of American
Religious Freedom. Smith presents a revised narrative to the
standard version of the story of American religious freedom. The
principle of separation of church and state, he argues, was not an
unprecedented American innovation, but an ideal that has
ancient origins. Instead of being a distinctive product of the
5. See generally MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND
THE MODERN WEST (2007).
6. Religion Clause jurisprudence is famous for being an “incoherent mess.” See, e.g.,
Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause,
90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002).
7. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89
TEX. L. REV. 583 (2011). This is not to say that these scholars were happy with it, but rather
they worked on religion issues piecemeal without attempting to make sense of the whole.
8. See, e.g., MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(2013); KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2 VOLS., 2006, 2008);
Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
Are Stronger When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701 (2011).
9. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001).
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Enlightenment, Smith characterizes American religious freedom
as a happy blending of explicitly Christian commitments with
cosmopolitan pagan attitudes (p. 7), and that this convergence of
ancient themes in an American package was unwittingly set aside
by the Supreme Court when it inaugurated its modern Religion
10
Clause jurisprudence in Everson v. Board of Education (p. 46).
Stepping firmly into the thicket of religion-state relations, the
Court infused a substantive core into the Religion Clauses which
originally had none—the Framers enacted them simply to
reaffirm the jurisdictional status quo (p. 8), that is, that matters
involving religion would remain the business of the states, and not
the federal government. The result of this move was to undo a
golden age of American religious freedom, one which is best
described as a period of fluid contestation, whereby competing
interpretations of the role of religion in American public life had
a rightful place at the constitutional table. According to Smith,
separation during this period meant separation of church from
state, not necessarily religion from government (p. 9). Thanks to
the Supreme Court, however, this substantive core, now
containing the principle of secular equality, has become hard
constitutional law (p. 10), any deviations from which are
considered to be official heresy. Consequently, American society
is now more divided than ever. Far from being a mere lamentation
on the state of Religion Clause jurisprudence, this historical
excursion serves as the backdrop to Smith’s ultimate concern that
American religious freedom is in jeopardy, not from religious
conservatives but from secular egalitarians (p. 11).
These are radical claims. And yet both the premise and the
implications of Smith’s revised narrative have much to offer to
current debates involving competing claims to religious liberty
and antidiscrimination. Perhaps the account could be seen as a
clarion call on the hurtling train of the new secular orthodoxy
threatening to unravel the lively experiment of the past two
hundred years. Of course, secular egalitarians would argue that
the opposite is true. But even in that vein, this account could also
be considered a confirmation of their beliefs, that their victories
are merely recent and most of all fragile against the tyrannical
forces of revealed religion.
In this review, I first briefly consider the uses of history in
Religion Clause jurisprudence and question the need for deep
origins in excavating the origins of the American principles of
10.

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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separation of church and state and freedom of conscience. A
mistaken resort to deep origins detracts from the political and
material conditions which shaped the ideas involving religious
freedom at the time of its drafting into the Constitution and
diminishes the role of human agency. Subsequently, I evaluate
Smith’s argument that the Supreme Court ended the golden age
of American religious freedom when it put a thumb onto the scale
and transformed religious freedom questions and answers into
hard constitutional law. I argue that these decisions, though
frustrating and incoherent as they might seem, in fact, are as
responsible for the remarkable religious pluralism that exists in
American society today as much as for the contemporary secular
extremism that Smith deplores. In the last part of this essay, I pose
a brief account of history and judicial review as two technologies
of constraint.
These challenges are not intended to undermine the book’s
goal but rather to support it. If the objective is to keep the
American pluralist experiment involving the place of religion in
public life from prematurely ending, the solution is not to go back
deep into an ancient, remote past or worse, discard history
altogether, but it is to let “We the People” grapple with these
difficult questions in political and legal circles, armed with a sense
of their own past, and an eye cast towards a future that is yet to
be written. By their very nature, these questions are open-ended.
Within a constitutional tradition such as ours, the task for the
courts is to keep that experiment alive.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEEP ORIGINS
The distinctiveness of religion as a matter of U.S.
constitutional law is seemingly reflected in the two prongs of the
Religion Clauses: that of disestablishment and free exercise. At
its core, these twin guarantees protect the right of Americans to
freely practice their religion. But there universal agreement
begins and ends. Since 1947, this unique formulation to protect
the liberty of conscience has generated a massive amount of
academic literature to explain why the Framers thought it was
essential not only to guarantee free exercise but also to mandate
disestablishment, and how those ideas could be made applicable
within the context of our own time.
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Not unlike those of other constitutional provisions, 11 the
historical origins of the Religion Clauses not only provide a
fascinating view into the eighteenth century world of the
Founding generation but they also give the Supreme Court an
authoritative ground for its decisions. Indeed, the first prong of
the standard model of constitutional interpretation is history,
which is to say, the reliance on the original intentions of the
12
ratifiers or the framers of the Constitution. As one commentator
remarked, “[t]he past may be only prologue, but for the Supreme
Court that prologue sometimes appears to direct the whole
13
drama.” Even if one does not wholly subscribe to the originalist
school of constitutional interpretation, the subject of which is
beyond the scope of this Review, judicial divination of the original
intent behind the Religion Clauses generates much normative
14
work in existing cases. Consider Justice Hugo Black’s majority
15
opinion in Everson, a landmark case in Religion Clause
jurisprudence which incorporated the Establishment Clause to
apply as against the states, in addition to the federal government.
Justice Black gave short shrift to the complex story of how the
principle of religious liberty found roots in and thrived on
American soil. Instead, he advanced what Noah Feldman called a
16
“‘shock’ hypothesis” of religious liberty, in which centuries of
persecution before and contemporaneous with the Founding
period largely provided the backdrop for the adoption of the
Establishment Clause, in order to come up with the rationale that
separation of church of state was intended by the Framers to
protect religious minorities.
It is hardly controversial in legal academic circles to state that
Everson was a modern invention of the Establishment Clause by
the Court. Among the most well-known of these challenges is
Philip Hamburger’s massive tome, Separation of Church and
11. The most recent example is the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Saul Cornell,
Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69
OHIO ST. L. J. 625 (2008).
12. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982).
13. John G. Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 502 (1964).
14. “No provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its
generating history than the religious clause of the First Amendment. It is at once the
refined product and the terse summation of that history.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 333
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
15. Id at 3–18. The Free Exercise Clause was incorporated much earlier in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
16. Feldman, supra note 6, at 682.
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State. In that book, Hamburger excoriated the Court’s historical
reappropriation as erroneously reading a separationist
understanding into the First Amendment which had none, and
attributed it to nativist, anti-Catholic sentiment, held by no less
17
than Justice Black himself. Similarly, Smith’s Rise and Decline
also takes Everson to task. But he does so for an entirely different
reason. Smith argues that Everson failed to acknowledge the
ancient roots of the American principles of separation of church
and state and freedom of conscience (p. 46).
In Smith’s retelling, Everson occupies a marginal, if not
distracting, role (p. 114), and instead credits the school prayer
decisions of the 1960s, particularly Engel v. Vitale and Abington
School District v. Schempp as profoundly more significant in
18
shaping modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Everson,
he argues, was a misleading starting point. But it is nonetheless
important because it mistakenly appropriated the backdrop of the
Enlightenment revolt against the dark side of Christendom,
though only partially true, as part of the American constitutional
narrative. At this point, Smith begins his revised narrative of
probing the origins of American religious freedom in deep
antiquity, starting with the conduciveness for inclusive tolerance
and freedom of Roman paganism (p. 17). From the fourth century
when Constantine adopted Christianity as the official religion of
the Roman Empire, to the papal crisis of the medieval period,
onward to Henry VIII’s break with Rome and the consequent
creation of the Church of England, up to the American Founding
period, he surveys more than two thousand years of Western
political development in order to recover the deep origins of the
much cherished American principles of separation of church and
state as well as freedom of conscience.
Rise and Decline is not a work of historical scholarship and at
different moments in the book Smith acknowledges that. It
19
belongs to a genre called history-in-law, which is a genre of legal
17. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002). Specifically,
Hamburger accused Justice Black, formerly a member of the Ku Klux Klan, of harboring
these anti-Catholic tendencies which formed the background of Everson’s separationist
thrust.
18. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public
schools is unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that governmentdirected prayer in public schools is unconstitutional even if the prayer is neutral and
students may remain silent or be excused from the room).
19. Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law,
71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 909 (1996) (defending history-in-law as a legal, not historical
practice).
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scholarship that creates a useable past in order to support or
generate a legal argument. In its more derogatory form, historyin-law is also known by the term law-office history, a perennial
20
topic of debate between lawyers and historians. Both sides of this
debate have been exhaustively mined for quite some time, and
this is not the moment to rehash those arguments. As a matter of
legal, rather than historical practice, then, history-in-law is
therefore not subject to the same criteria for evaluation as
ordinary history. Ordinary history emphasizes the pastness of the
past; history-in-law mines it to support a contemporary position.
That said, however, basic rules of historical practice would
presumably still apply. Smith’s reach into deep antiquity does not
provide a solid ground for his argument that libertas ecclesiae or
freedom of the church is a major animating principle behind
separation of church and state as well as the modern-day
conception of liberty of conscience. Indeed, opponents of this
21
position, labeled as religious institutionalism, attack this move as
22
The seemingly nostalgic
anachronistic and selective.
resuscitation of the bygone era of cosmopolitan paganism under
Roman rule, and the dramatic medieval showdown between
Henry IV of Germany and Pope Gregory VII which featured
Henry’s famous Walk to Canossa (pp. 32-33) focuses on
questionable episodes from which to plumb for historical
imprimatur, and readily invites criticisms of the sort that legal
scholars Micah Schwartzman and Richard Schragger make in
their article.
The resort to deep origins is not unique to American legal
scholarship on the Religion Clauses. Until very recently, the
general historiography of human rights has always emphasized its
deep roots, whether as early as the Mesopotamian Codes of
Hammurabi or from the natural rights claims of the seventeenth
23
century. The revisionist pushback to these accounts revolves
mainly around their teleological inclination, that is, the seductive
tendency to find a kind of conceptual coherence across historical
periods without proper accounting for its immediate political,

20. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 11. The earliest criticism is in Alfred H. Kelly, Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965).
21. The most sustained opposition is in Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman,
Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013) (historical anachronism is
only one among several criticisms of this position).
22. Id. at 928.
23. See, e.g., MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (2d ed. 2008).

ANNA SU SMITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

134

12/29/2014 3:10 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:127

intellectual, and cultural milieu. 24 The eminent historian Eric
Foner called this “the plumb line” problem, in which a political
theory or idea is given a fixed definition and is then traced how it
25
has been worked out over time. One problematic result of this
approach is that it naturalizes present arrangements, and ignores
human agency in the process of working out abstract ideas in
concrete and rather messy historical realities. By invoking deep
history, however, Rise and Decline does the opposite—it
generates and naturalizes a normative ideal, not necessarily the
present arrangement. But as Schwartzman and Schragger
rightfully, if briefly, note, Pope Gregory VII’s cry of libertas
ecclesiae was part of a broader, long-running political struggle that
was not a solely an instance of the church attempting to wrest its
26
independence from an overbearing secular authority. As one
scholar put it, even the great confrontation between Henry II and
the martyred Archbishop Thomas Becket, the same episode
which does a lot of work in Smith’s account (p. 33), was more an
“accidental creation of personality and circumstance rather than
27
of any great inevitable clash of principle.” In addition, the idea
of dualism, that is, that Christ himself instituted dual jurisdictions
between earthly and spiritual authorities, was far from a selfevident notion even at that time. Medieval popes acknowledged
it with the caveat that the spiritual realm was of more importance
than the earthly one. Kings and emperors, unsurprisingly, did not
subscribe to this hierocratic view. Accordingly, canonists,
theologians and civil law scholars from both camps engaged in
dueling interpretations.
Notwithstanding this analytical flaw, one finds much in
Western history on which to base Smith’s assertions that
separation of church and state and liberty of conscience were not
just American inventions. And one need not go that far back into
it. That the very idea of religious freedom has had religious, rather
than secular, origins, finds ample evidence in not-so-deep history,
and in academic scholarship. The leading figures of the Protestant
Reformation, such as John Calvin, Philipp Melanchthon, and
Martin Luther himself, all wrote on the liberty of conscience from
a definitively theological and certainly Christian standpoint.
24. The most influential is SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY (2010).
25. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM xiv (1999).
26. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 21, at 935.
27. J.A. Watt, Spiritual and Temporal Powers, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT C. 350- C.1450, 391 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988).
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Political theorist Eric Nelson, for instance, has recently argued
that theological debates in Europe around the notion of a Hebrew
Republic influenced the development of ideas surrounding
religious tolerance amongst British Protestants during the early
28
modern period. Jeremy Waldron has also argued that John
Locke, that quintessential Enlightenment thinker and progenitor
of so many American constitutional ideas, was very much
influenced by Christian theism in his political writings, including
29
his ideas on religious toleration.
It is difficult, therefore, to justify the resort to deep origins if
the Western European religious and political milieu from which
American constitutional thought, especially on the relationship
between religion and government, arose offered similar resources
and arguments. Consider John Locke, an immediate and major
influence in the thinking of the two giants of American religious
freedom: Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Locke’s A Letter
Concerning Toleration and Two Treatises of Government already
expounded on the idea of separate spheres of religious and civil
authority. Unlike the medieval decretists, however, he did not
think one was more important than the other. Instead, his
distinguishing principle was whether one was necessary for
30
salvation or not, an explicitly religious rationale. Rise and
Decline does recognize that the Enlightenment, mainly through
Locke but also in a different way, David Hume, served as a
conduit for Christian ideas, rather than a complete break from it,
in order to counter the mainstream narrative that the
Enlightenment was a triumphant revolt of reason against religion.
Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Baruch Spinoza are
the towering philosophical figures associated with this particular
strain of Enlightenment thinking. But Locke in particular
developed his theory on separate spheres of authority or
jurisdictions based on Christian rationales, while Jefferson
stressed the importance of the voluntariness of faith, though he

28. ERIC NELSON, THE HEBREW REPUBLIC: JEWISH SOURCES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2010). Of course, the
competing, if more mainstream, narrative, that religious freedom has had rationalistic
Enlightenment origins, is also present. Historian Mark Lilla deftly surveys the great
philosophers and thinkers of the same period in his book. LILLA, supra note 5.
29. JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS
OF LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).
30. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (Dover 2002) (1689). For an excellent discussion of how his
ideas were brought to the United States, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U L. REV. 346, 354–98 (2002).
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referenced a nonsectarian deity. 31 They were also the ones most
directly associated in developing American constitutional
thought. But what the book appears to do is to use Locke,
Madison, and Jefferson as mere seventeenth century mediums for
the more ancient ideas of dual jurisdictions and liberty of
conscience (pp. 39–40). That channeling flies in the face of almost
five hundred years of discrete political and intellectual struggles
within various contexts—institutional, cultural, political—in
Europe from the end of the Middle Ages up until the American
revolutionary period.
No contemporary idea appears ex nihilo, that much is true.
But it is also true that no idea or principle stays the same as it
travels throughout human history, influenced and developed as it
were by varying political claims, unintended consequences, and
shifting moralities. Even for history-in-law, the past, especially the
deep past, is still very much a foreign country.
II. THE PROBLEM OF TWO CONSTITUTIONALISMS
Rise and Decline also addresses the distinction between two
kinds of constitutions: the hard Constitution, that is, the formal
legal document that Article III judges interpret and enforce, and
the soft constitution, the “more amorphous but not necessarily
less important body of constitutive understandings, practices, and
commitments” (p. 96), and laments how the shift towards the
former to the detriment of the latter ended the golden age of
American religious pluralism.
This claim has three major components: first, there was
indeed a golden age of American religious freedom, one where
competing interpretations of questions involving religion had a
rightful place as a constitutional matter; second, there was a
definitive shift from the soft constitution to the hard constitution;
last and most important, the move to the hard constitution
undermined the erstwhile distinctive American strategy of
dealing with religious diversity (p. 113). Let us address each of
these claims briefly.

31. The younger John Locke shared similar views with Thomas Hobbes on an
Erastian arrangement, wherein religion is subservient to the state for the sake of civil peace
and order. He modified his views later on in Two Treatises.
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A. GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Smith argues that Americans have largely subscribed to two
contrasting interpretations of the Republic, and that these two
interpretations, secularist and providentialist, coexisted,
“sometimes cordially and sometimes combatively” (p. 87) from
the Founding to the present day. That secularist and evangelical
impulses together characterized much of American history is not
in question. Americans for the most part agreed that religious
freedom was important and central to the national identity though
interpretations of what that ideal actually meant remained
constantly up for grabs.
The period that Rise and Decline extols as a golden age also
happens to coincide with two of the Great Awakenings in U.S.
religious history, a period of Protestant revivalism which elevated
moral vocabulary and fused evangelicalism with the moral
reasoning of the prevailing republican tradition. From the more
secular elites to the evangelical masses, everybody believed that
religion was important in cultivating civic virtue, the debate
mostly surrounded the question of how. These periods, roughly
from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the
twentieth, saw the emergence and flourishing of a number of
Protestant sects and movements. These movements emphasized
the application of Christian teachings to social problems, from
32
self-improvement to social reform. But this was also the time
when intense religious persecution ran rampant in U.S. history.
Widespread anti-Catholic sentiment, a longtime American
prejudice inherited from Europe, exploded as a reaction to the
influx of Irish immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, the
school wars of the nineteenth century just one episode in this long33
running saga. During the Gilded Age, Jews, buoyed by their
great and rapid financial success, also became the target of
populist attacks, though none compared to intensity of the anti34
Catholic campaign. These persecutions were mostly rooted on
nativist reactions to the social consequences of massive
immigration, but even a homegrown religion such as Mormonism
fell to pervasive bigotry which saw its followers flee from a small
32. See generally MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA’S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS
ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005) (for the Second Great Awakening); ROBERT T. HANDY,
A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALITIES (1984).
33. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (1955); On Catholics in particular, see JOHN
MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY (2003).
34. MCGREEVY, supra note 33.
TO
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town in Illinois to the Territory of Utah. In 1890, as a reaction to
Congress escheating all of its assets in favor of the federal
government, the Mormon Church finally capitulated and
35
disavowed its controversial practice of plural marriage. These
examples hardly scratch the not-so-desirable surface of the
American religious landscape of the period. Indeed, the
conspicuous absence of the travails of Native Americans involving
the practice of their traditional religion in mainstream legal
scholarship on religious freedom is glaring evidence.
Rise and Decline does not mention any of these episodes,
even as it acknowledged that “[r]eligious minorities sometimes
suffered estrangement, persecution, even violence” (p. 109). The
book appears to almost romanticize the period, and then
conceding in effect that one who is already inclined not to find
anything positive in this period would not find it satisfactory. But
this is not simply an inability to find the silver lining but simply to
acknowledge that if there was indeed a golden age, it was simply
a golden age for some, and not for most. The majority of
Americans of the period found themselves in a milieu
undergirded by a Protestant Christian worldview, even given the
theological differences among them, and that provided them a
common language to express their commitments. That the level
and nature of the persecution within the United States was of a
milder nature than those in Europe during the same period should
hardly be praiseworthy. Using a more modern example, Smith
also mentions the relatively peaceful period of the 1950s under
the Eisenhower presidency, the calm which would be undone by
the school prayer decisions. There is ample historical evidence
that suggests, however, that this momentary religious unity—
36
captured by Will Herberg’s classic Protestant-Catholic-Jew —was
largely a manufactured effort by the government as part of a
37
cultural offensive in the early Cold War years. This is not to say
that American religiosity came out of the blue, far from it, but
that, at this time, there was an orchestrated, top-down, attempt to
present a united domestic front in combating the spread of
Communist ideology. As the initial sense of urgency waned, the
leaders of this movement, from President Eisenhower to the
35. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 219–20 (2002).
36. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1983).
37. JONATHAN P. HERZOG, THE SPIRITUAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: AMERICA’S
RELIGIOUS BATTLE AGAINST COMMUNISM IN THE EARLY COLD WAR (2011).
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Supreme Court in Engel, halted the march of the “sacralization”
of American life. And even if one’s focus is on the political order,
as Smith argues, not the suffering of individual dissenters, the
American settlement which seemed to manage to hold the nation
together regardless of religious differences is as true today with
the courts in the picture as it was back then when they were not,
or at least not as much. Perhaps courts are even more important
now than before because of the incomparable magnitude of
38
religious diversity which currently exists.
B. FROM SOFT CONSTITUTIONALISM TO HARD AND BACK
A crucial point that Rise and Decline makes is that what made
such a golden age possible was soft constitutionalism. The notion
of a small-c constitution, “that assemblage of laws, institutions
and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason,
directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that compose the
39
general system that community had agreed to be governed,”
predates the founding of the United States. Prior to the
incorporation of the Religion Clauses, Smith celebrates the genius
of the American settlement of questions involving religion which
consisted of various courts reaching contrary conclusions.
Because these were primarily decided as matters of state law, no
group could claim that their interpretation was the definitive
constitutional interpretation, in the big-C, contemporary sense of
the term. Even Supreme Court decisions at that time, such as Holy
Trinity Church v. United States, which infamously declared that
40
“this is a Christian nation,” Smith argues, were intended to
reflect fluid social facts, not constitutional ones. As popular views
evolve, whether on the secularist or providentialist side, the
political process could reflect and give effect to those changes by
virtue of legislation. Under this view, states would truly be the
local laboratories envisioned by the federal setup. Most
importantly, it avoids the polarizing effect that today’s Supreme
Court decisions seem to create and foster as one side or the other
is left with the feeling of alienation from the national
constitutional project.

38. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW
RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US (2010).
39. HENRY ST. JOHN, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, Dissertation on Parties, in
BOLINGBROKE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 88 (David Armitage, ed. 1997).
40. 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). This is, however, a case involving statutory
interpretation, not the Religion Clauses.
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There are two problems with this claim. First, the premise
that the Establishment Clause was enacted to be a jurisdictional
bar only against the federal government and nothing more is still
a matter of ongoing debate. It is true that the clearest we could
infer from the historical record is that there was to be no national
church similar to the Church of England. But there the consensus
ends, and what to make of the substantive content of the
Establishment Clause is still a hotly contested topic among
41
scholars. Moreover, a full-blown federalist view of the
Establishment Clause detracts from a conception of the Bill of
Rights as a guarantee of individual rights, instead of, or in
addition to, a limitation on federal government action. Lastly, as
a practical matter, this position finds no support from the current
members of the Supreme Court, except for Justice Clarence
Thomas.
More significantly, Rise and Decline faults the Supreme
Court’s elevation of principles such as secularism or neutrality as
42
hard constitutional law, thus losing what was initially its
beneficially agnostic posture. Because this is how the Supreme
Court has interpreted what the big-C Constitution definitively
means, competing providentialist claims are now understood to
be and relegated to the status of “constitutional heresy” (p. 123).
The lamentable result of this development, first begun by the
Court in its school prayer decisions Engel and Schempp—Smith’s
43
long-running bêtes noires —was to prop up an illusion of secular
neutrality, still prevailing up to this day, which in reality, is a
conceptual impossibility given that the baseline for measuring
44
such is not available. In a nutshell, what might be a neutral
baseline for some is not neutral for others.

41. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131 (1991) (for a federalist reading of the entire Bill of Rights); but cf. Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual,
and Historical Account, 88 IND. L. J. 669 (2013) (arguing that Establishment Clause not
only immunized states but also individuals against the consequences of establishing a
national church). For a discussion on why history cannot definitively support the federalist
position, see Feldman, supra note 30, at 405–12.
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (adopting the three-prong Lemon test
one of which posits that the legislation involved must have a secular purpose); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring Bible reading in public schools to be
unconstitutional for violating government neutrality on religion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (declaring that government must be neutral with regard to religion).
43. Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the
School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945 (2010).
44. For a fuller account of this point, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT
OF SECULAR DISCOURSE (2010).
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At several instances, Rise and Decline sounds like a call to
45
“take the Constitution away from the courts,” that is, to bring
the insights of popular constitutionalism, the contemporary
intellectual movement in American constitutional scholarship
which seeks to broaden the community of authoritative
constitutional interpreters, to include other branches of
government, the states and the people at large, to Religion
Clauses jurisprudence. Defending the prevailing somewhat messy
and incoherent jurisprudence in this area is an unenviable
Herculean task, and one which is not fit for a review essay. But
even conceding the rather unprincipled way the Court has went
about in resolving cases involving religion, and the indeterminate
46
nature of the principle of neutrality currently in use, the
Supreme Court, and by extension, hard constitutional law, is far
from being the enemy.
The big-C Constitution is more than just a written document;
it also comprises of a set of practices and understandings which
47
serves as its interpretive context. Thus, a constitution serves as
legal framework for an ongoing debate and dialogue in which all
48
members of a society could participate. Courts can therefore
facilitate, rather than just hinder, popular deliberation about
constitutional issues. Here, perhaps, the gulf between soft
constitutionalism and hard constitutionalism is not as wide as
Smith sees it to be. The world we presently inhabit features both
hard and soft constitutionalism; this is what historian and legal
scholar Sarah Barringer Gordon calls “the new constitutional
49
world.” While the Supreme Court makes definitive rulings,
popular mobilizations around these decisions and the meanings
they give to them overlap. They create unlikely alliances in favor
of, and against such decisions. For instance, in the aftermath of
the Goodridge decision in Massachusetts legalizing same-sex
45. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
46. But see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
NEUTRALITY (2013) (arguing that neutrality is a coherent and attractive principle which
promotes the goals of a secular state through the use of deliberate and careful vagueness).
47. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012).
48. Adam Shinar, The End of Constitutional Law?, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 181, 207
(2014) (reviewing Louis M. Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience, and arguing for the
discursive benefits of having a constitution).
49. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA (2010). Similar to Smith, she
characterizes the pre-Everson era as the “old constitutional world.” Id. at 213.
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marriages, an unlikely alliance, erstwhile unheard of, between the
Archdiocese of Boston of the Roman Catholic Church and the
conservative Protestant group Focus on the Family, joined forces
in a campaign for a state constitutional amendment to overturn
the decision. On the opposing side, liberal religious groups
50
banded together with secular feminists. In the same way that
Brown v. Board of Education became a rallying point for the civil
rights movement, the same case could be made for those who are
as concerned with the promotion of gender and marriage equality
as much as the protection of religious liberty of believing
Americans.
It is true that losers have no reason to abide by settlements
that they deeply oppose. And here, Smith sees these definitive
constitutional pronouncements as only creating a section of the
American populace, mostly religious Americans, presumably
seeing themselves as perennial losers, and thus intensifying the
culture wars that he deplores. Indeed no other pair of decisions
by the Supreme Court produced more hate mail against the Court
51
than Engel and Schempp. But these decisions are an invitation
to mobilize and forge alliances, and not, contrary to Smith’s claim,
to stop any conversation. The remarkable political alliances and
reconfigurations which occurred in the wake of Everson and
Engel and Schempp, perhaps most vividly captured in the political
transformation of the originally anti-Catholic group, Protestants
and other Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State (POAU), into the more liberal, nonsectarian Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State (AU), are a
testament to this fluid social landscape that both shapes and is
shaped by these Supreme Court decisions. Groups, even religious
ones, are never monolithic entities.
Having raised Brown as an analogy, it is impossible not to
mention the alternative view of what Brown was actually
responsible for. Under legal historian and constitutional scholar
52
Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis, Brown crystallized southern
resistance to desegregation and, at least, temporarily, destroyed
any form of southern moderation on racial issues, while pushing
50. Id. at 204–07.
51. Id. at 86 (“However predictable the holdings may seem decades later, they fell
like a meteor into American society.”).
52. Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,
81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). A fuller account is in MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2004).
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to the forefront extremist positions. Rise and Decline appears to
entertain a similar concern that Supreme Court decisions in the
past and in the future, especially with the onslaught of litigation
in all levels from district courts all the way up to the Supreme
Court, often involving a zero-sum face-off between the values of
non-discrimination and religious liberty, would bring out the
extremist positions on both sides, and only one out of these two
equally important and cherished American values would end up
alive. That is not such a far-fetched scenario. Consider the slew of
state religious freedom bills which have since been proposed as a
reaction to recent federal court and state supreme court decisions
striking down same-sex marriage bans. Religious conservatives
feel they are under a secularist attack while supporters of gender
and marriage equality express their disdain for religious beliefs
they thought are being unfairly imposed upon them. For instance,
although it has since been vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer, the
controversy generated by Arizona State Senate Bill 1062 is an
illustrative example. On its face, the proposal simply amends the
existing state Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to
clarify that “exercise of religion” means the “practice or
observance of religion, including the ability to act or refusal to act
in a manner substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether
or not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of
53
religious belief.” It also expands the definition of “a person” to
include not only religious institutions but also groups, including
corporations. But because of the highly-charged atmosphere
surrounding the issue, opponents unsurprisingly have gone at
each other with increasing levels of vitriol, reading into the text,
half-real, half-imagined, monsters ranging from religious bigotry
54
to secular extremism to destroy.
III. “THE FAULT IN OUR STARS”: PRESERVING THE
AMERICAN EXPERIMENT
In the latest church-state case to date, Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical v. EEOC, 55 a unanimous Supreme Court once again
invoked the authority of history in upholding the constitutionality
of the ministerial exception from Title VII nondiscrimination
53. S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2014).
54. Sarah Posner, Is Supreme Court Jurisprudence Making State Religious Freedom
Bills More Dangerous?, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.
religiondispatches.org/dispatches/sarahposner/7680/is_supreme_court_jurisprudence_ma
king_state_religious_freedom_bills_more_dangerous/.
55. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (upholding constitutionality of the ministerial exception).
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regulations. The question presented in that case was whether a
Lutheran church could be sued for violation of employment
discrimination laws when it fired an employee (who was put on
leave for narcolepsy treatment but insisted on reporting for duty)
for insubordination and disruptive behavior. The Court viewed
the Religion Clauses to mean not only that the federal
government cannot establish a national church but that it is also
56
prevented from having any “role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”
The church, it turns out, is exempt from such suits. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts pointed to two of James
Madison’s statements: first as Secretary of State, that “the
selection of church ‘functionaries’ was an entirely ecclesiastical
57
matter left to the Church’s own judgment;” and again, when
Madison became President, he vetoed a bill incorporating the
Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, declaring that the
“the bill . . . comprehending even the election and removal of the
Minister of the same . . .” violates the First Amendment, as
58
evidence of this understanding.
Critics attacked the decision for giving undue deference to
59
churches at the expense of individual rights, thus flipping the Bill
of Rights on its head. The Court’s account of First Amendment
history has been described as a “curious mash-up of religious and
60
political history that stops in 1791.” One commentator claimed
that Hosanna-Tabor demonstrates the danger of historical
61
analogy and originalism in resolving contemporary problems,
even while acknowledging that alternative histories also exist that
support the other side. But is it true? Did the Court really just use
“English history to overcome civil rights legislation approved by
62
Congress?” To be sure, not every invocation of James Madison,
though widely recognized as the father of the Religion Clauses
(and not Thomas Jefferson) should be treated as holy gospel for

56. Id. at 703.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 704.
59. See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L. J. 981 (2013);
“The Ministerial Exception,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan, 12, 2012, at A22.
60. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Church, THE IMMANENT FRAME, (Jan. 31, 2012,
4:25 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/01/31/the-church/.
61. Griffin, supra note 59, at 990 (“Many of the ministerial exception cases have
involved women clergy in Christian denominations for whom women’s ordination was not
even imaginable at the time of the nation’s founding.”).
62. The decision also cites the freedom of the English church in King John’s 1215
Magna Carta. Id.

ANNA SU SMITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM_DRAFT 1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BOOK REVIEWS

12/29/2014 3:10 PM

145

the purpose of constitutional interpretation. 63 And one can find
opposing strands of thought existing during the same historical
moment. But as the Court stated, the text of the First
Amendment, that is both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause, does give special solicitude to the rights of
64
religious organizations. Requiring a church to accept or retain
an unwanted minister is not just a mere employment matter, but
an infringement on the freedom of the religious group’s right to
determine its own faith and mission.
It is against such a postmodern backdrop that today we face
questions such as “is religion special?,” a question that would
certainly acquire increasing constitutional and sociological
salience in American society in the years to come. Such a question
betrays a willingness to discard the distinctive place of religion in
the American constitutional scheme, one that is based largely in
history. But the Founding generation did think religion was
special, or at least special enough to merit a separate guarantee in
the Bill of Rights. In fact, for the most part of American history,
religion was, and still is, special, at least for an admittedly
65
shrinking section of the populace. In other words, religion’s
uniqueness as a subject of constitutional protection is not just for
epistemic reasons. If religion was simply like any other secular
affect, it could be protected under the umbrellas of freedom of
speech, freedom of association or even equal protection, but
something important is truly lost—for one, an authentic
expression of people’s beliefs—if public debates are narrowly
66
framed in those terms, in which case, one is brought back full
circle to the never-ending search for a neutral baseline.
This is also the question that Rise and Decline tries to get its
reader to confront, but it does so by posing a self-subverting
paradox: if religious freedom has historically theological origins—
specifically the notions of dual jurisdictions and liberty of
conscience—and we have, by our adherence to modern-day
63. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999)
(arguing that contemporary perceptions of the influence of Madison’s ideas at the time of
the Founding, specifically Federalist No. 10, is probably exaggerated).
64. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 at
706 (2012). But see Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 21, at 976 (misreading the
decision to say that it has nothing to do with the rights of churches qua churches).
65. Pew Research Religion & Public Life Project, Nones on the Rise (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/ (showing the increasing number
of Americans who do not identify with any religion).
66. For a great and thoughtful exposition of this point, see JEFFREY STOUT,
DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2005).
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principles of secularism and neutrality, disabled the state on
acting on religious or theological rationales (p. 143), then religious
freedom is a house that stands on shaky ground. But that, it seems,
is the wrong proposition to make. Secular rationales also exist in
support of religious freedom, though contested; in the American
context, why should we need more than what the Constitution
explicitly protects and why should its original intent still matter?
What Smith essentially wants to get his readers to look at is how
courts have all but forgotten the historical and particularly
religious legacy of this important freedom, and to make matters
worse, have upheld and continue to uphold a secular neutrality
rationale that has largely no basis in history and does not even
make sense as a philosophical matter. Faced with the “challenge
of modern equality” (p. 147), the unfortunate endgame of this
charging train seems predictable.
As a response to Smith’s concerns in particular and a way to
keep the American pluralist experiment alive in general, this
essay suggests a consideration of history and judicial review as
mutually reinforcing technologies of constraint. The history of the
Religion Clauses still matters, not because it offers any solution or
prescribes the right answer, but because it offers everyone, from
the individual citizen to Supreme Court Justices, a kind of
constraint. Note that this statement is not the same as “history
says this, and therefore the result ought to be this . . .” as critics of
67
this inclination are wont to point out. The aim is not to do
normative history. While it might be the case that nothing
prevents actors from creating their own versions of history meant
to reinforce or support a preexisting contemporary agenda, that
view erroneously presupposes that the present can be completely
severed from the past. That is simple human conceit. However we
view that past, it is an inescapable inheritance that provides fixed
points of reference for our present-day conversations, the
constitutional ones most especially. American constitutional
identity might be evolving, but it is still rooted in history. Thus,
the results can never veer far off. At the very least, the history
behind the Religion Clauses is evidence of an intent, acquiesced
68
to and repeatedly affirmed across time, that the protection of
religious liberty is special and merits a distinctive guarantee in the
67. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 909 (1993) (criticizing the use of history to justify
conservative results).
68. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 134–76 (1995).
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American constitutional tradition. It is history immediate enough
and with sufficient resources for both sides of the debate.
At the same time, judicial review, especially that of the
Supreme Court, is still the best institutional vehicle to realize
these quite abstract ideals of disestablishment and free exercise in
practice. While it does amplify the stakes of a debate, as Smith
rightfully points out, litigation also addresses gaps that popular
mobilizations cannot. Courts provide a venue for unpopular
minority opinions, whether a minority vis-à-vis the rest of the
country or a minority vis-à-vis the rest of the state or some other
69
local subdivision. For instance, it would have been rather hard,
if not impossible, for adherents of the religious group Jehovah’s
Witnesses in the early 20th century to get popular support for
their refusal to salute the American flag. Notwithstanding claims
that courts, even the Supreme Court, are quite limited in terms of
70
inducing broad-sweeping social changes, judicial review first and
71
foremost affords a forum for the redress of individual grievances.
Under this view, structural or systemic reverberations which are
often at the heart of public interest or cause lawyering take a
secondary role. But in the process, judicial interpretation of the
Religion Clauses also delineates the range of possible meanings
and available constitutional vocabulary with which the public and
other branches of government could engage then and in the
future. Not all constraints are limitations but instead function as
72
an invitation to construct a richer nomos. As the history of
litigation involving religion in the past half a century since
73
Everson would show, the Supreme Court is hardly the final word
on the matter. The value of judicial review in a world where
separate communities with their respective normative universes,
are nonetheless required to coexist in one society under one
74
Constitution, is that it can ensure cooler heads prevail, and thus,
keep the conversation going for the foreseeable future.
69. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
70. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
71. The subject is too complex to be addressed sufficiently in a review essay. For this
claim in all its nuance, see Alon Harel & Adam Shinar, Between Judicial and Legislative
Supremacy: A Cautious Defense of Constrained Judicial Review, 10 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 950
(2012) (a justification of judicial review is that it affords a right to a hearing).
72. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
73. Gordon, supra note 49.
74. See PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2013).
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CONCLUSION

Rise and Decline looks at the future of American religious
freedom with much trepidation. As a result, it reaches beyond the
Founding period and far back into deep Western history in search
of solid ground, and takes a dim view of the secularist slippery
slope that the Supreme Court has taken contemporary Religion
Clause jurisprudence. This essay has argued that both the
nostalgia for the deep past and its disdain for the Supreme Court
are misplaced. But that does not mean this thought-provoking
book does not raise fundamental questions, or that its diagnosis
of the problem is wrong. Smith claims that there is something
fundamental that would be lost if we abandon the logic of
jurisdiction that animated the historic commitment to freedom of
church and conscience. He is right. As Mark DeWolfe Howe
wrote, “[G]overnment must recognize that it is not the sole
75
possessor of sovereignty.” It is this concern which is at the heart
of the book. The allure of equality, without the depth and
robustness a substantive heritage such as religion could imbue it,
might be nothing more than cupping sand. We could celebrate it
in the short term, but if we do, in the long run, we will end up all
the more impoverished for it.

75. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term – Foreword: Political
Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953) (on the political theory of
pluralism).

